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Abstract 
Modifying the standard analytical apparatuses for direct and indirect tax evasion to 
incorporate forward indirect tax shift in a monopolistically competitive environment, this 
paper maintains that indirect tax evasion would exceed for sure direct tax evasion only under 
consumer risk neutrality and a tax policy zeroing the tax shift. Also, in the presence of tax 
evasion, there cannot be optimal direct-indirect tax mix, because tax evasion is 
accompanied by uncertainty and hence, nonlinearities in the tax schedules that cannot 
be dealt with at least practically. 
Keywords: Direct and indirect tax evasion, Forward indirect tax shift, Consumer risk 
neutrality 
JEL Classification: H22, H24, H25, H26 
 
1. Introduction 
Direct tax evasion has been a matter of extensive investigation (see e.g. 
Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein 1998, and Slemrod 2007), but much less so the issue of 
indirect tax evasion (see e.g. Arias 2005), which explains why to my knowledge, there 
is only Fedeli’s (1998) paper linking the two.  She argues that the technical 
differences between direct and indirect taxation favor size-wise indirect tax evasion. 
Modifying the standard analytical apparatuses for direct and indirect tax evasion to 
incorporate forward indirect tax shift, this paper qualifies Fedeli’s conclusion by 
noting that intuitively the presence of such shift weakens firms’ and strengthens 
consumers’ incentive to evade taxes. If firms know that the indirect tax will be paid 
ultimately by the consumer, they have no reason to alter their tax report strategy. But, 
the consumer does have an incentive to do so, once the shifted indirect tax comes to 
add to its income-tax burden. This is very important, because as Gillis and Kannekens 
(2014) report about the current trends in taxation, corporate tax rates have begun to 
stabilize and indirect taxation is rising under overwhelming changes to indirect tax 
regimes. In view of these trends, the analysis below suggests that an in-crease in 
consumer tax evasion should be expected. The next section presents this analysis, 
followed by a concluding section putting it into further perspective with the literature. 
 
2. The Analysis 
 
Assuming identical monopolistically competitive firms, one might 
contemplate profit maximization with regard to a consumption good in general as 
follows. Let  be the quantity of this good as a function of its price, , produced under 
constant marginal cost, . Let also,  be the audit probability,  the proportion of 
sales reported,  the sales tax,  the proportion of the tax which cannot be shifted 
forward to consumers,  the tax evasion cost, and  the penalty in case tax evasion is 
detected. The expected utility ( ) on profit ( ) will then be: 
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where  captures risk aversion, neutrality, or lovingness depending on whether 
or , respectively. Setting  and solving for , 
one obtains that: 
 
This is the optimal value of  for firms. Setting it equal to one in (1) and solving for , 
one obtains the value of  that the policymaker should choose to nullify indirect tax 
shift to the consumer. 
Let, next, the typical consumer’s purchasing power, , be reduced by an 
income tax, , and by the amount  of the indirect 
tax shift, given that  would be available to spend on  were . Firms set 
presumably  so that to equalize consumer revenue loss with tax shifts gain. Now, if 
 is the income reported to the tax authority,  the audit probability, and  the 
fine in case the consumer is caught cheating, the expected utility of the consumer will 
be: 
 
where  captures risk aversion, neutrality, or lovingness depending on whether 
or , respectively. Setting  and solving for , one 
obtains that: 
 
where  and . In view of 
(1), (2) suggests that indirect tax evasion, , affects  and thereby direct tax 
evasion, , because simply .  
And, when , it is not clear that  
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As a matter of fact, it is not clear even if , because setting it in the last inequality 
and utilizing (1), the comparison would be given by the even more cumbersome 
relationship: 
 
What complicates the comparison is the presence of uncertainty. Fedeli’s conclusion 
obtains with certainty only when consumer at least risk neutrality is assumed beyond 
, because the right-hand side of the last inequality is simply zeroed in this case. 
It turns out that indirect tax evasion would exceed for sure direct tax evasion iff  
 and . 
Critical to this discussion has been the assumption about identical 
monopolistically competitive firms. For a big monopoly and a formal or informal 
cartel known to the authorities, it does not make much sense to be talking about tax 
evasion, because the audit probability is equal to one, and because it can manipulate  
at will. The same might be said about the audit probability with regard to a few large 
rival firms, but  can certainly become under these circumstances a means of rivalry. 
Although this rivalry does not qualify the zero indirect tax evasion case under such 
market regimes, it does suggest that it would matter in a monopolistically competitive 
or dominant firm environment. Indirect tax evasion on the part of the small firms does 
pay within such an environment of anonymity, because simply  for them, and 
because the indirect tax shift becomes one more instrument through which the 
monopolistically competitive long-run equilibrium can emerge, or through which a 
dominant firm might be confronted. Finally, under perfect competition, a  is 
still possible, because the authorities do know that tax evasion would increase short-
run profit and postpone long-run marginal cost pricing, much more so under a tax 
shift in which case. But, the firm that would decide to compete by internalizing the 
tax and lowering the price would be followed ex hypothesi by all other firms, 
rendering thereby meaningless a discussion about indirect tax evasion under perfect 
competition. 
3. Concluding Remarks 
To conclude, note that no optimal direct-indirect taxation mix obtains from 
this discussion. In the presence of tax evasion, there cannot be such optimality, 
because tax evasion is accompanied by uncertainty and hence, nonlinearities in the tax 
schedules that cannot be dealt with practically. Boadway et al. (1994) attest to the 
opposite but only in the presence of income taxation evasion modeled as tax 
avoidance with costs, and disregarding the possibility of indirect tax evasion. They 
formalize thus De Marco’s (1936) argument that in the face of income tax evasion, 
indirect taxation should supplement the direct one, because: “income which escapes, 
in whole or in part, direct valuation at the moment of its production is watched for and 
seized in the successive moments in which its possessor spends it” (p. 131). But, “if 
indirect taxation is joined to direct taxation, with unethical agents, the equivalence in 
terms of government's revenues does not hold” (Fedeli 1998, p. 385), because if not 
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anything else of practical considerations. As noted earlier, the state nowadays is 
increasingly relying on indirect taxation, expanding it to new fields such as banking 
and energy. And, for the tax administration, tax reporting is equivalent to the 
collection and processing of data whose sheer volume, variety and velocity present 
technological challenges in securing, storing and tracking them. The concern for tax 
compliance has thereby increased but good results will be obtained only if the 
taxpayer who previously had a motive to tax evade, adopts systems that would enable 
the tax authorities to track him/her down! 
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